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The Efficiency of Institutions:
Political Determinants of Oil Consumption in Democracies

John S. Duffield and Charles R. Hankla
Department of Political Science
Georgia State University
Atlanta, GA

Forthcoming from Comparative Politics

Abstract

Oil consumption has varied significantly among democracies, but scholars have not
systematically studied the political determinants of this variation. We examine the effects of
political institutions on a democratic country’s propensity to consume oil. We argue that, other
things being equal, more centralized national political institutions facilitate the adoption of
policies that lower oil intensity. Our primary focus is on the impact of veto players, but we also
consider electoral systems, party organization, and legislative-executive relations separately. We
evaluate our hypotheses with a TSCS analysis of all democracies since the first oil shock in 1973
(contingent on data availability), and we make use of an error correction model to separate shortand long-term effects and to correct for the non-stationarity of the dependent variable. We find
strong support for the hypothesized link between numerous veto players and slower reductions in
oil intensity as well as weaker support for the influence of party decentralization.
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Energy consumption is an important determinant of state interests, and since the early 1960s oil
has accounted for roughly 40 percent of global energy use. Even in 2008, despite a relative
decline in oil’s share to 34.8 percent over the previous decade, it still surpassed coal (29.3
percent) and natural gas (24.1 percent) as an energy source. Moreover, outside of China, which
still relies on coal to meet some 70 percent of its energy needs, oil continues to provide for more
than 38 percent of the world’s primary energy consumption.1 At the same time, oil consumption
has varied substantially across states, even when controlling for population or economic output.
For example, oil consumption per capita has typically been much higher in the United States than
in France, Japan, or even the United Kingdom, another major oil producer.
Such variations in oil consumption can have important implications for the policies and
well-being of states. Other things being equal, levels of consumption can affect the relative
competitiveness of oil-dependent sectors and industries, especially during times of high oil
prices. Likewise, countries that use more oil can suffer more from disruptions in world oil
markets, and more vulnerable states may be more inclined to use extreme measures to ensure
access to oil supplies.2
What accounts for variations in national oil consumption? Surprisingly, this question,
despite its political importance, has rarely been asked by political scientists, and it has never
been satisfactorily answered. Scholars have conducted few, if any, systematic studies of the
political factors that determine a country’s propensity to consume oil. That is the goal of this
article. We seek to explain the potentially consequential variation in oil consumption across
democracies. In particular, we seek to account for differences in reductions in oil intensity since
the first oil shock sent prices skyrocketing and created uncertainty about oil supplies.
As a first step, we control for structural and economic variables that may be expected to
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affect oil intensity. The core of the paper, however, focuses on how national political institutions
might affect oil intensity through government policy. Our broad argument is that lower levels of
oil intensity have been a public good, at least since the mid-1970s, and that more centralized
political institutions in democracies facilitate the aggregation of societal interests into policies
that foster a lowering of oil intensity.
We draw on the political economy literature to derive hypotheses about domestic political
institutions that may be expected to impact oil use. Our primary focus is on veto players, but for
robustness, we also consider the effects three particular types of political institutions: electoral
systems, party organization, and legislative-executive relations. We then evaluate our
hypotheses with a time-series cross-sectional analysis of all democracies over the thirty-four year
period (1974-2007) following the first oil shock. We make use of an error correction model to
separate short- and long-term effects as well as to correct for the non-stationarity of the
dependent variable.
Our results provide strong and robust support for our primary hypothesis concerning the
role of veto players, demonstrating that democracies with more veto players tend to have more
difficulty reducing oil intensity. We also find evidence that more decentralized parties are
associated with less conservation as expected, although the results are less robust than for veto
players. Contrary to our expectations, however, we find no evidence that the electoral rule has a
systematic effect on oil use or that systems in which political power is more concentrated in the
executive are better able to reduce oil consumption. Thus we conclude that our findings, overall,
provide further confirmation of the contribution of political institutions to the provision of public
goods in general. But they also indicate the need for further theoretical and empirical
investigation of the processes through which such institutions can promote reduced oil intensity
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and other specific types of policies that benefit society as a whole.

I. Oil Consumption Across Democracies and Years

World oil consumption has grown by more than 150 percent since 1965.3 The oilconsuming behavior of democracies is of particular interest, however, because many of them
have exhibited the highest per capita levels of oil consumption. And with just a couple of
exceptions – the USSR/Russia and China –democracies have routinely filled the ranks of the
largest overall oil users and, as consumers, have exerted the biggest impact on world oil markets.
Thus oil consumption trends in democracies are especially important for understanding global
tendencies.
Perhaps the most useful overall indicator of oil consumption for comparative purposes is
oil intensity, which is calculated by dividing total oil consumption by gross domestic product
(GDP). It describes the amount of oil needed to produce a dollar of economic output and thus
controls for differences in total oil consumption due to changes in the amount of economic
activity alone. Consequently, we focus our analysis on explaining cross-national differences and
temporal changes in oil intensity.4 Because oil intensity is a measure of efficiency, it should
reflect the effects of government efforts to promote conservation, our primary theoretical
interest.
How has oil consumption varied among democracies over time? For illustrative
purposes, we offer a brief description of trends since 1965 in twenty-one OECD countries, which
constitute the majority of the democratic country-years that have existed over this period.
Although the average oil intensity for these countries rose in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
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Figure 1 reveals a clear downward trend between 1973 and 2007. The average oil intensity
dropped from 170.1 metric tons of oil per million dollars of GDP (in constant 2000 dollars) in
1973 to 80.9 in 2007.

Figure 1 about here

Nevertheless, these trends should not be allowed to obscure major differences across the
states. For example, U.S. oil intensity has averaged about 50 percent higher than that of France
and of the UK, and about twice that of Japan. Canadian oil intensity has been even higher. In
1965, oil intensity levels among these illustrative cases ranged from a high of 242.3 (Canada) to
a low of 62.4 (Switzerland), and in 2007, the highest level (155.0 in Belgium) was nearly four
times as great as the lowest (40.9 in Switzerland again).

II. Economic and Structural Determinants of Oil Intensity

What factors best account for these patterns and variations of oil intensity in democracies? Like
other economic phenomena such as trade, much of oil consumption can presumably be explained
by economic and structural conditions that are beyond the immediate control of government
policy. Among the conditions with the greatest promise to explain oil intensity are the cost of
oil, national income, sectoral composition, population density, and energy self-sufficiency.
In market economies, oil costs money. Consequently, when the cost of oil rises, we
expect overall consumption to fall. We also expect oil intensity to decrease, although not to the
same extent, since the decline in oil consumption might be accompanied by some decrease in

5

economic activity.

H1: As the cost of oil rises, oil intensity will decrease.

The cost of oil is counterbalanced by national income. As people’s incomes increase,
they tend to buy more goods and services. Thus we expect that oil intensity will rise with
average individual income, as measured by GDP per capita. As countries grow yet richer and
more technologically advanced, however, we might also expect energy efficiency to increase,
and at some point, efficiency gains should begin to outpace increases in consumption, resulting
in lower levels of oil intensity.

H2: As national income increases, oil intensity will exhibit a curvilinear form, first
increasing and then decreasing.

The cost of oil and national income will influence oil consumption across the board. Oil
intensity will also depend on the sectoral composition of the economy, however. In particular,
we expect the agricultural and, especially, the industrial sectors to be more oil intensive than the
service sector as a general rule.

H3: As the share of the economy devoted to industry and agriculture (vis-à-vis services)
increases, oil intensity will increase.

Other factors will have the greatest impact in particular end-use sectors, which include
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transportation, industry, and the commercial and residential sectors. One such factor is
population density. Much oil is consumed in the process of moving people and goods from place
to place. Indeed, the transportation sector accounts for a high percentage (approximately twothirds in the United States, for example) of all oil consumption.5 The demand for transportation
is in turn influenced by the distribution of a country’s population.

We expect that the more

concentrated the population is, the lower oil consumption and oil intensity should be.

H4: As population density increases, oil intensity will decrease.

Finally, we expect oil consumption to be influenced by the degree to which a state
depends on oil imports. Although oil markets have become increasingly integrated over the
years, oil produced domestically may be available to users at lower prices and with greater
certainty than oil from other sources.

H5: As oil consumption produced domestically increases, oil intensity will increase.

III. Political Determinants of Oil Intensity

Generally, we expect markets to determine the level of national oil consumption, except where
governments seek to promote or discourage it for social reasons. Oil consumption can have a
variety of negative economic, security, and even environmental externalities.6 Consequently,
central governments may have an incentive to adopt policies intended to reduce those costs,
largely by achieving lower levels of oil intensity.
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These incentives have been especially pronounced since the first oil shock. The 19731974 oil crisis saw a quadrupling of the price of crude oil, resulting in massive wealth transfers
to oil exporting countries, and raised questions about the security of oil supplies. In reaction,
most governments have made efforts to reduce oil consumption over the years, while at the same
time protecting their countries against possible disruptions of foreign oil supplies. Beyond
increasing the energy efficiency of their own operations, however, governments in market
economies exercise little direct control over aggregate consumption. Instead, they may
incentivize or require other oil users to reduce consumption and to use energy more efficiently.
Among the policy tools at their disposal have been taxes and tax incentives; regulations for the
efficiency of motor vehicles and other oil-consuming devices; and, at a more general level,
incentives for promoting a shift to less oil-intensive economic activities.7 Other government
policies may seek to reduce oil imports by increasing domestic oil production and to minimize
the short-term economic impact of oil supply disruptions, for example, by creating strategic
stockpiles.
Nevertheless, the precise combination of policies pursued by democracies since the first
oil shock has varied substantially. For example, U.S. efforts to reduce oil consumption have
emphasized the establishment of vehicle fuel economy standards, while European countries have
maintained much higher taxes on petroleum-based fuels.8 And arguably, national efforts to
reduce oil consumption have enjoyed varying degrees of success, at least judging by continuing
differences in levels of oil intensity. Assuming that these differences cannot be entirely
attributed to economic and structural factors such as those identified above, what political factors
might help to account for them? Why, in particular, might different governments have been
more or less able to influence levels of oil consumption and efficiency?
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One way to approach this question is to regard such policies as generating public goods.
Many of the benefits that these policies yield, in terms of reducing the economic, environmental,
and national security costs of oil consumption, accrue to society as a whole. Thus the adoption
of policies that, among other things, reduce oil intensity is related to the ability of governments
to provide public goods.
The ability of democracies to provide such policies and the resulting benefits, where they
may be desirable, varies. In particular, not all democratic governments are equally able to take
measures that would result in significant decreases in oil consumption. Representative
governments are constrained to varying degrees by society and private interests. Society in the
aggregate might benefit from such measures, but particular sectors and groups will inevitably be
hurt by particular policies and thus are likely to oppose them. For example, oil-intensive
industries and even consumers as a whole are unlikely to support higher taxes on oil and
petroleum products. Likewise, the manufacturers of oil-consuming devices, such as the auto
companies, are likely to resist costly regulations intended to increase fuel efficiency. Thus
success in adopting and implementing energy policies may depend on the ability of governments
to take unpopular measures that may nevertheless serve the common good and to resist the
pressures generated by special interests and other concentrated pockets of domestic opposition.
Under what conditions, in fact, are governments in representative democracies most
likely to be able to provide such policies? We argue that more centralized political institutions
enable governments to adopt policies that promote lower levels of oil intensity that would tend to
advance the overall interests of the state and society.9 Centralized political institutions are less
likely to be constrained by special interests that would resist conservation policies. Of course,
the institutions must also be democratic in character, as the theorized link between centralization
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and energy conservation depends critically on the electoral connection. Autocrats would have no
incentive to respond to the interests of citizens for public goods, although they may have their
own reasons for reducing their countries’ oil consumption. Because there is no systematic
literature on the role of political institutions in shaping energy policy, we draw heavily on the
broad political economy literature to develop our more specific hypotheses below.

A. Veto Players and Political Constraints
We focus our attention on the relationship between oil intensity and the number and diversity of
policy-making veto players, which is perhaps the most general measure of political institutional
centralization and constraint. The role of veto players in policy-making has been most
thoroughly theorized by Tsebelis, who argues that as the number of individuals or institutions
with veto power over policy increases, the likelihood of policy change declines.10 The logic is
straightforward. When more political actors must agree to a policy reform, the probability of one
of them preferring the status quo and thus blocking change increases. This effect should be
particularly likely when the relevant veto players are ideologically diverse, as in divided or
coalition government.
The importance of veto players to policy stasis has been tested across a wide variety of
policy arenas, with broad empirical support. For example, in the trade literature, Henisz and
Mansfield find that the effect of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions on trade openness is
mediated by the number of a country’s veto players.11 Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman argue
that economic reform will be harder in transitional democracies with fragmented and polarized
party systems, and Hallerberg finds that states with more veto players (i.e., federal, multiparty
systems) are less able to use independent monetary and fiscal policies effectively.12 In addition,
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Spruyt has shown that the difficulty or ease of decolonization was greatly determined by the
number of veto players in the governments of the former imperial powers, and a number of
authors in the budgetary politics literature have found a robust and significant link between the
size of government coalitions in parliamentary systems and the ability to rein in deficit
spending.13
Theoretically, we expect that countries with fewer and less diverse veto players will be
more likely to adopt policies that successfully reduce oil consumption and intensity. In countries
with multiple, diverse veto players, the incentives to improve efficiency provided by concerns
about the price and availability of oil are less likely to be transformed into successful
conservation policies because status quo interests that would be harmed are more likely to
obstruct policy change.

H6: Democracies with fewer and less diverse veto players (i.e., fewer political
constraints) will be more likely to reduce oil intensity.

B. Other Political Institutions
For robustness, we also examine the possible impact of three other particular types of national
institutions that have been studied in the wider political economy literature: electoral systems,
party organization, and legislative-executive relations. These institutions are, of course, among
the components of the veto player concept (although not necessarily of the Political Constraints
variable that we use to operationalize the concept). Our broad intuition is that, when these
democratic institutions are more centralized, governments will be better able to introduce
policies that reduce oil intensity.
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1. Electoral Systems
We begin with electoral systems, which play a key role in the process of interest representation.
The basic argument here is that the broader and more diverse the set of interests an elected
official must represent, the more likely she is to support policies that provide public goods. By
contrast, the more decentralized and fragmented the interests that she represents, the more likely
she will be to advocate for local, private goods. We derive this argument primarily from the
literature on trade policy, where a number of studies have found an association between electoral
district size and open trade. Rogowski’s approach to the question is particularly relevant for our
purposes.14 In his analysis of OECD countries, Rogowski argued that democracies that are more
dependent on trade generally choose large, proportional electoral districts as opposed to small,
single-member districts. This is because, for Rogowski, the lobbying power of concentrated
protectionist interests will be greatly increased in small, single member electoral districts. By
contrast, providing public goods, such as free trade, may be a more efficient way to ensure
reelection in larger, proportional districts, where the collective interest more closely
approximates the national interest in free trade. 15
A number of other scholars have found support for the role of constituency size in trade
policy outcomes, although some, more recently, have not.16 This disagreement notwithstanding,
there is ample reason to believe that the argument may apply equally well to oil intensity. In this
scenario, the collective interests of larger, proportional electoral districts would better
approximate the national interest in reducing energy intensity, whereas particularistic interests
that oppose reductions would have significant lobbying power in smaller districts. This
argument leads us to our fifth hypothesis:
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H7: Democracies with larger, proportional electoral districts will be more likely to reduce
oil intensity.

2. Party Organization
Even in electoral systems that foster the fragmentation of interest representation through the use
of small, single member electoral districts, this tendency can be counteracted by the institutional
characteristics of political parties. In particular, the stronger a political party is, the better able it
is to aggregate interests and, when in power, to provide public goods.
The systematic study of party organization and public policy is relatively new in the
political economy literature. It received a significant boost when Carey and Shugart developed a
way to measure an individual legislator’s “incentive to cultivate a personal vote” rather than
follow the policies of national party leaders, based on such factors as party nomination power
and electoral system characteristics.17 Since the publication of this measure, at least three
scholars have used various applications of it to examine the provision of public policies. Nielson
examined 18 developing countries and found that centralized parties (which rein in the personal
vote) are more likely to liberalize their trade policies.18 Similarly, Hallerberg and Marier
identified an association (mediated by executive strength) between centralized parties and
balanced budgets in Latin American democracies.19 And Hankla expanded the analysis to 81
developed and developing democracies and also found support for the relationship between
centralized parties and freer trade.20 The logic of these three arguments is similar: centralized
party leaders have an incentive to provide public goods because of their national constituency,
whereas individual legislators have a greater incentive to provide private goods. As a result,
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when central party leaders are empowered and individual party members are constrained, the
provision of public goods such as free trade or balanced budgets becomes more likely. We apply
this logic directly to reductions in oil intensity:

H8: Democracies with more centralized parties will be more likely to reduce oil intensity.

3. Legislative-Executive Relations
We turn finally to possible links between legislative-executive relations and oil intensity. We
assume that, among democracies, national executives will tend to have broad, national
constituencies, whereas individual legislators will generally represent more particularistic
interests.21 Therefore, we expect that when national decision-making is centralized in an
executive, and when that executive is controlled by a single individual or party, the provision of
public goods, such as lower oil intensity, will be easier.
This expectation is supported by numerous findings in the political economy literature.
In his examination of Latin American countries, for example, Nielson finds that delegation to
presidents is associated with lower tariffs.22 Using a similar logic, Hallerberg and Marier and
Franzese find that strong presidents are generally associated with more balanced budgets. 23
Haggard and Kaufman argue that, because of their relative insulation, strong executives can
facilitate economic reforms in newly democratized countries, at least in the short run.24 And
scholars of the developmental state generally find that more insulated government institutions
facilitate the disciplining of capital and labor necessary to promote the public’s long term interest
in economic growth.25 Because executives, whether elected directly or by a parliament, have
national or semi-national constituencies, they should be more insulated from interest group
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pressure.
The well-developed literature on the role of executive preference and divided government
on American trade policy outcomes arrives at similar findings. Keech and Pak demonstrate
empirically that American Presidents, regardless of party, have advocated some degree of trade
liberalization.26 Moreover, a number of scholars have suggested that when Congress and the
Presidency are controlled by different parties, there will be a protectionist bias in policy. This
outcome could result from the reluctance of Congress to delegate “fast track” or trade promotion
authority to a President of the opposing party.27 As a result, Congress will retain greater control
over trade and, because of its greater openness and proclivity to logrolling, protection will likely
increase. While several scholars, most recently Karol, have questioned this argument, few have
challenged the fundamental notion of the free-trading president.28
The same general logic should apply to parliamentary systems. When coalition
governments are in power, public goods should be in shorter supply than when single party
governments hold sway. The budget literature on party fragmentation, discussed above with
respect to veto players, has borne out this argument in a number of studies.29 It is, however,
important to realize that the precise nature of the relationship between unified government and
public goods provision may vary between parliamentary and presidential systems, and so they
should be analyzed separately.30 These considerations suggest the following hypotheses:

H9: Presidential democracies will be more likely to reduce oil intensity under unified
than under divided government.
H10: Parliamentary democracies will be more likely to reduce oil intensity under singleparty than under coalition government.
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IV. Statistical Analysis

A. Model

We ask how well the various factors identified above can explain longitudinal and cross-national
variations in oil intensity. We are especially interested in understanding how effectively
different democracies have been able to reduce oil intensity after the first oil shock drove up the
price of oil around the world and raised concerns about the security of oil supplies. To
accomplish these goals, we analyze all democracies over the period 1974-2007, contingent on
data availability.31 We begin our analysis in 1974 because it was only after the first oil shock that
oil consumption became a major political issue. We make the assumption that the political,
economic, and strategic pressure for oil conservation remained relatively constant during our
period of analysis. While this is not strictly true, it would be difficult to operationalize the crosstemporal variation in pressure and, more to the point, the wide variety of conservation policies
employed by the states could take anywhere from a few weeks (price incentives) to years
(mileage standards) to manifest. As a result, a simple post-1973 additive model is the best option
for testing our arguments.
To analyze our data, we make use of an error correction model, a very useful technique
that is only now finding its way into the political science literature.32 Two factors motivate this
choice, one econometric and the other theoretical. First, our dependent variable (Y), oil
intensity, is non-stationary for the country-years we consider, exhibiting a downward trend for
most countries. This non-stationarity presents a variety of complex estimation problems that are
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most easily resolved by differencing our dependent variable. Second, the use of an error
correction model allows us to distinguish between the short- and long-term effects of some of
our independent variables (X) on the dependent variable. The coefficient of a differenced
independent variable (diffX) estimates the effect of a change in that variable on a change in the
dependent variable (diffY), a relationship that can be termed the short-run impact of X on Y.
The coefficient of a non-differenced independent variable, by contrast, estimates the effect of the
value of X on changes in Y, or, put differently, the variable’s long run effect.
In the error correction model, then, our dependent variable becomes differenced oil
intensity. Following the standard estimation for error correction models, we include the lagged
level of the dependent variable in the estimation to control for the impact of the size of oil
intensity on its change. We also include both the differenced and lagged non-differenced values
of our economic independent variables on the right side of the equation. We do not, however,
difference our political variables because they vary very little across time.

B. Operationalization of the Variables

1. Dependent Variables
We operationalize our primary dependent variable as the annual change in oil intensity (Diff Oil
Intensity). It is calculated by dividing oil consumption (in metric tons) from the British
Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy by gross domestic product (in millions of
constant 2000 US dollars) from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).33. To
test for robustness, we also make use of the annual change in a country’s overall energy intensity
(Diff Energy Intensity), which we expect to be influenced in similar ways by the economic,
structural, and political variables, as a dependent variable. Indeed, energy intensity in the OECD
17

countries has also declined more or less steadily since 1973, although by only about two-thirds as
much as has oil intensity. We calculate this variable from data for primary energy consumption
(in the same units) from BP and GDP per capita data (in millions of constant 2000 US dollars)
from the World Bank. Overall energy consumption, of course, includes not only oil but also
other fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable sources of energy. If our independent variables
prove to be significant across both operationalizations, we will have even stronger evidence in
support of our arguments.

2. Economic and Structural Variables
To measure the price of oil, we use data from BP for crude oil prices per barrel in constant U.S.
dollars. We expect both the lagged and differenced oil price variables (Lag World Price and Diff
World Price) to have a negative association with oil intensity.34
We take all of our remaining economic and structural variables from the World Bank.35
We measure the long-term effects of increasing income on oil intensity using the lagged natural
log of GDP per capita and the lagged squared natural log of GDP per capita in constant dollars
(Lag lnGDPpc and Lag SqlnGDPpc). We difference these variables to capture the short-term
effects of growing income (Diff lnGDPpc and Diff SqlnGDPpc).36 As noted in H1, we expect
increases in the level of GDP per capita to have a positive effect on oil intensity for less
developed countries and a negative effect for developed countries.37 Similarly, to measure the
effect of sectoral composition on oil intensity, we use measures for the share of gross national
income attributable to industry (Lag Percent Industry) and agriculture (Lag Percent Agriculture),
using the service sector as the reference category. We expect oil intensity to increase with
industry share in particular, and also probably with agricultural share. We include both the
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lagged and differenced values of both variables in the model.
To measure the long-term impact of population concentration on oil intensity, we use
overall population density (Lag Pop Density), or the average number of people per square
kilometer. Other things being equal, lower population densities mean a greater need for
transportation. We use differenced population density (Diff Pop Density) to capture the shortterm impact of increasing population density (identical to population growth in the absence of
territorial acquisition or loss) on oil intensity.
Next, we seek to control for the share of oil produced domestically. Because data on oil
production are not available for many of our cases, we use as a proxy intensity of energy
production (total domestic energy production in metric tons of oil equivalent divided by gross
domestic product in millions of constant 2000 US dollars). We expect overall energy production
to correlate with oil production and thus for oil intensity to increase as intensity of energy
production goes up, other things being equal. As usual, we include both lagged and differenced
values of the variable in the model. Finally, to control for cultural factors and for the regional
dissemination of ideas, we include dummy variables for North and Central America, South
America, Oceania, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Asia, with Western Europe as our omitted variable.38 These regional dummies can also be used
to control for the possible effects of European Union membership, although the overlap between
the EU and the Western Europe dummy is imperfect. Basic data relating to the economic and
structural control variables can be found in Table 1.

3. Political Variables
We evaluate our primary political hypothesis, the relationship between veto players and oil
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intensity, using the fifth political constraint variable developed by Henisz.39 This variable
provides an aggregate measure of the degree to which the formation of policy is constrained by
(1) the presence of multiple veto gates, including the executive, two possible chambers of the
legislature, the judiciary, and sub-federal units and (2) the control of these veto gates by
ideologically dissimilar parties. Political systems with more veto gates, as well as those systems
where veto gates are controlled by more ideologically heterogeneous parties, will score higher on
the variable (Political Constraints), which can range between “0" and “1".
To operationalize party organization, we make use of the data set developed by Hankla,
which is based on Carey and Shugart’s ballot variable.40 Our variable Party Decentralization is
coded “1" when party leaders have little influence over legislative candidate selection (as in
primary systems), and “0" when their influence is significant. Control over the ballot is among
the most important sources of party centralization.
We operationalize our remaining political variables using the Database of Political
Institutions (DPI).41 To measure electoral district size and proportionality, we use the HouseSys
variable, which is coded “1” when the majority of seats in a country’s lower house are elected by
plurality vote, “0” when they are elected under proportional representation, and “0.5” when seats
are evenly divided between the two. To test our theoretical expectations linking centralized,
executive decision-making with lower oil intensity, we create dummy variables for divided
presidential government (Divided Pres Govt), unified presidential government (Unified Pres
Govt), and coalition parliamentary government (Coalition Parl Govt). These variables are based
on the interaction of DPI’s AllHouse dummy, coded “1” when the party of the executive controls
all relevant legislative houses, with DPI’s System variable, coded “1” for presidential
governments.42 Our omitted variable is of course majoritarian parliamentary systems.
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We estimate one set of regressions for the veto player (Political Constraints) models, and
another for the models evaluating the other political institutions. This approach is reasonable
because the Political Constraints variable encompasses many of the more specific political
institutions that we are considering. To estimate these models, we use random effects regression,
a technique that allows us to consider the panel structure of the data in both our point estimates
and our standard errors, but which is also compatible with our often time-invariant political
variables.

We also make use of fixed effects regression to verify the robustness of our veto

player models, as there is sufficient temporal variation present. Summary statistics for our
variables are reported in Table 1.

Table 1 about here

V. Results

Table 2 presents the results of our models. In it, we report three Political Constraints models
(random and fixed effects models with Diff Oil Intensity as the dependent variable and a random
effects model with Diff Energy Intensity as the dependent variable) and two models testing our
additional political variables (a random effects model with Diff Oil Intensity as the dependent
variable and another using Diff Energy Intensity). The results provide strong support for our
primary political hypothesis (H6) – that, in the post 1973 world, democracies with fewer veto
players have been better able to reduce their dependence on oil. The variable Political
Constraints is significant at the 1% level for our primary oil intensity model with random effects
and at the 5% level for both the oil intensity fixed effects and the energy intensity models. Its
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effect is also substantively important, leading to an increase in oil intensity of about 9 metric tons
of oil per million dollars across its range, just over half a standard deviation.

Table 2 about here

The results also provide support for most of the economic hypotheses that we identified
in the theory section. In both of the oil intensity models, higher oil prices reduce oil
consumption as expected in H1, although surprisingly the effect seems to be primarily a long run
effect (as evidenced by the insignificance of differenced price). By contrast, the price variables
are insignificant in the energy intensity models, perhaps because higher oil prices may both lead
countries to consume more of other types of energy and dampen economic activity, with a net
neutral effect on overall energy intensity.
As expected, in two of the three models, higher levels and faster growth of domestic
energy production are associated with greater oil and energy intensity; in only one model are the
effects not statistically significant. This finding indicates that states that can produce more of
their own energy have fewer incentives to conserve, probably because they face fewer of the
security externalities that arise from import dependence. There is also evidence that, as
agriculture and especially industry give way to services in modern democracies, oil and energy
intensity decline. This effect is stronger with the differenced variables, suggesting that it is a
short term relationship that is more determined by shifts in economic structure than by the long
term make-up of an economy. Turning to the population density variables, growth in population
density (equivalent to population growth in the absence of territorial change) is associated, as
expected, with reductions in oil and energy intensity.
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In our primary model, oil intensity with random effects, higher levels of GDP per capita
are significantly associated with increases in oil intensity whereas higher levels of squared GDP
per capita are associated with decreases. This finding, also strongly present in our primary
model testing the additional political variables, is in keeping with H2, which predicts that
national income should have a curvilinear effect on oil consumption. In other words, we find
evidence here that poorer countries in their early phases of growth use more oil, whereas richer
countries, as they become even richer, find new ways to conserve. In the remaining models, it is
the differenced GDP per capita variables that are significant, indicating that fast growth is
associated with less efficiency and slow growth with more. This finding is compatible with the
previous one as developing democracies tend to experience more rapid changes in GDP growth
than richer democracies.
Turning now to the models testing our additional political variables, we find support for
the hypothesized relationship (H8) between party decentralization and higher oil intensity. The
Party Decentralization variable is strongly significant (at the 1% level) in our primary oil
intensity model, with the predicted effect substantively important. Democracies with
decentralized parties will, on average, see greater reductions in oil intensity by over one-third a
standard deviation. We do not, however, find support for the Party Decentralization variable in
our energy intensity robustness test, calling into question the robustness of the relationship.
The results for the divided presidential government (Divided Pres Govt), unified
presidential government (Unified Pres Govt), and coalition parliamentary government (Coalition
Parl Govt) dummies indicate that single party control of the legislature has no significant effect
on oil intensity in parliamentary systems. Moreover, presidential systems with divided
governments are found to be more inclined to conservation than other types of systems. These
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surprising findings are less robust than our findings for Political Constraint, however, as they are
significant in the primary oil intensity model but not in the energy intensity model.
Finally, we find no evidence to support the hypothesized relationship between electoral
proportionality and energy conservation (H5), with the HouseSys variable insignificant in both
models. Future research could usefully try a wider variety of indicators, but, as noted before, the
precise effects of the electoral system in other policy areas have been controversial. The results
for our control variables in the additional political models generally accord with the results of the
Political Constraints models.

VI. Conclusion

Because the level of oil consumption and energy consumption more generally can have
important economic, environmental, and security implications for states, it is important to
understand their determinants. We have examined the relationship between national political
institutions and oil intensity in democracies. In particular, we have tested the argument that
more centralized political institutions have made it easier for democratic governments to reduce
levels of oil intensity since the 1973-1974 oil crisis caused prices to jump dramatically and raised
questions about the security of oil supplies.
We have found that the most comprehensive measure of political institutional
centralization, veto players, has a significant effect. Lower levels of political constraint are
significantly associated with larger decreases in oil and energy intensity. Alternative political
institutional variables yield mixed results. Our measure of the decentralization of political
parties is significant in the expected direction, suggesting that democracies with more centralized
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parties have an easier time implementing policies that lower oil consumption. By contrast, we
find no relationship between oil intensity and electoral system structure, a variable that has been
questioned as a determinant of other policy outcomes but which we believe requires more testing
before we can definitely reject it as a factor in energy policy. Finally, our interactive measure of
the centralization of power in the executive produced the surprising result that divided
presidential systems are more likely to reduce oil intensity than other types of systems, although
the effect is not as robust as that of veto players.
Overall, these results provide further confirmation of the link between political
institutions and cross-national differences in public goods provision. Most of the research
making this connection has developed in isolation, with trade politics scholars, budgetary politics
scholars, and others producing arguments broadly independent of one another. We extend these
arguments to an understudied but important policy arena. More than that, however, this article
demonstrates the usefulness of crossing sub-field boundaries to expand our understanding of how
political institutions factor into public policy.
At the same time, our results leave unclear the precise mechanisms through which
centralized political institutions foster the adoption of policies that result in lower levels of oil
intensity in particular, and thus indicate the need for further investigation of these processes.
Some answers may come from the development of better empirical measures of the different
dimensions of democratic centralization explored here. But greater attention to the operation of
party, electoral, and policy-making institutions and how they may vary across democracies and
across issue areas is also merited. Likewise, we are unable to identify the effects and
effectiveness of different types of policies for reducing oil intensity and the conditions, political
or otherwise, that favor or militate against their adoption. Given the particular methods
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employed here, policy choices are endogenous to the analysis. More fine-grained statistical
techniques, involving the collection of detailed data on policy choices, or in-depth case study
analysis will be necessary to shed light on these important issues.
From a more practical perspective, this study also helps to identify the potential
opportunities for and constraints on efforts aimed at increasing economic efficiency, protecting
the environment, and promoting national security through energy policy in the future. The
advanced industrialized (OECD) democracies continue to account for more than 50 percent of
the world’s energy consumption, and some 85 percent of the energy they use still comes from
fossil fuels.43 Yet their incentives to reduce the use of oil and other fossil fuels are perhaps
greater than ever. Over the past decade, the price of oil, still the most widely used single energy
source, has sustained its largest increase, in both absolute and percentage terms, since World
War II. Over the same period, prices for natural gas, the second most important fuel, have also
risen substantially.44 Meanwhile, the advanced industrialized countries have come to depend
increasingly on oil and gas imports from unstable or potentially hostile countries. And concern
about the negative environmental consequences of burning fossil fuels, especially climate
change, has reached unprecedented levels.
Some reductions in fossil fuel consumption have already come about simply as a result of
higher prices and the heightened concerns of individuals about the negative environmental and
security externalities of energy use. But national policies will continue to play an important role
in promoting conservation and energy efficiency. As this study has shown, however, how
successful democracies can be at using policy to reduce energy consumption and intensity will
depend in part on their political institutions. As a general rule, those with less centralized
political institutions, especially in the form of larger numbers of more ideologically diverse veto
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players, will find it more difficult to take strong measures.
Indeed, there is some recent evidence to support this generalization. Of the largest
advanced industrialized democracies, France and the United Kingdom arguably enjoy the most
centralized political institutions. And in the last several years, first France and then the UK have
developed comprehensive national energy policies.45 In contrast, the United States, where
political authority is more diffuse, has thus far seen only piecemeal, and relatively limited,
legislative efforts to address high energy prices, concerns about climate change, and dependence
on foreign oil.46 Of course, it would be inappropriate to draw definitive conclusions from such
limited observations. And the differences in the degree of political constraint are not so great as
to ensure that these countries are fated to follow completely different policy paths. But it does
suggest that efforts to promote greater energy efficiency and conservation through policy will
face greater obstacles in some countries than others because of the relative efficiency of their
political institutions.
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Table 1: Summary of the Variables
Variable
Diff Oil Intensity
Diff Energy Intensity
Lag Oil Intensity
Lag Energy Intensity
Political Constraints
Unified Pres Govt
Divided Pres Govt
Coalition Parl Govt
HouseSys
Party Decentralization
Diff World Price
Lag World Price
Diff Energy Production
Lag Energy Production
Diff Percent Industry
Lag Percent Industry
Diff Percent Agriculture
Lag Percent Agriculture
Diff Pop Density
Lag Pop Density
Diff lnGDPpc
Lag lnGDPpc
Diff SqlnGDPpc
Lag SqlnGDPpc
North & Central America
South America
Oceania
Eastern Europe
Middle East & North Africa
Asia
Africa
Polity

Range (Min-Max)

Mean

St. Dev.

-375 to 45.7
-384 to 269
47.1 to 1598
105 to 4560
0 to .894
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
-27.0 to 47.7
17.3 to 96.6
-209 to 227
5.97 to 2559
-12.5 to 13.8
19.9 to 60.6
-7.72 to 10.4
.963 to 38.0
-1.50 to 21.5
1.83 to 1156
-.172 to .150
5.39 to 10.6
-2.76 to 2.52
29.0 to 112
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
0 or 1
6 to 10

-2.95
-5.08
143
388
.713
.509
.171
.212
.373
.218
.822
38.9
-1.88
352
-.245
32.6
-.279
7.75
1.05
133
.020
9.00
.366
82.4
.068
.126
.058
.303
.027
.140
.011
9.21

16.9
35.9
92.9
474
.153
.500
.377
.409
.482
.413
11.1
19.0
30.6
434
1.65
6.13
.941
7.07
2.71
161
.033
1.22
.550
20.4
.253
.331
.234
.460
.161
.347
.105
1.15
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Expected
Effect on Y
N/A
N/A
Negative
Negative
Positive
Uncertain
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Uncertain
Positive
Uncertain
Negative
Uncertain
Uncertain
Uncertain
Uncertain
Uncertain
Uncertain
Uncertain
N/A

Variables

Lag Level of Y
Political Constraints

Table 2: Results of the Models
Fixed
Random
Random
Effects
Effects
Effects
(Oil
(Energy
(Oil Intensity)
Intensity)
Intensity)
-.141***
-.234***
-.056***
(.006)
(.018)
(.004)
10.1***
11.9**
16.3**
(3.88)
(5.87)
(7.66)

Random
Effects
(Oil Intensity)
-.201***
(.007)

1.71
(2.23)
-6.98***
Divided Pres Govt
(2.36)
-0.822
Coalition Parl Govt
(1.48)
1.77
HouseSys
(2.19)
5.59***
Party Decentral
(2.13)
-.056
-.038
-.036
-.001
Diff World Price
(.040)
(.040)
(.080)
(.036)
-.053*
-.071**
-.030
-.081***
Lag World Price
(.027)
(.030)
(.054)
(.024)
.023*
.014
.245***
.032**
Diff Energy Prod
(.013)
(.015)
(.027)
(.014)
.007***
-.002
.012***
.011***
Lag Energy Prod
(.002)
(.005)
(.003)
(.002)
.649**
.577**
1.52***
. 071
Diff Percent Industry
(.276)
(.282)
(.554)
(.243)
-.055
. 078
.024
.201*
Lag Percent Industry
(.114)
(.151)
(.221)
(.117)
. 162
.191
2.82***
-.633
Diff Percent Agric
(.466)
(.470)
(.937)
(.429)
. 335**
. 151
-.168
.507**
Lag Percent Agric
(.168)
(.228)
(.335)
(.200)
-.936**
1.20
-.1.43
-1.62***
Diff Pop Density
(.460)
(1.08)
(.941)
(.556)
. 006
. 014
. 017
.009
Lag Pop Density
(.008)
(.041)
(.015)
(.010)
-187
-285**
-709***
-291***
Diff lnGDPpc
(118)
(122)
(231)
(99.9)
35.6***
15.2
-8.12
49.0***
Lag lnGDPpc
(9.17)
(26.2)
(18.2)
(11.7)
9.55
13.9*
37.2***
13.8**
Diff SqlnGDPpc
(6.90)
(7.11)
(13.6)
(5.82)
-2.34***
-1.92
-.075
-3.26***
Lag SqlnGDPpc
(.515)
(1.36)
(1.01)
(.656)
Regional Dummies
Yes
Dropped
Yes
Yes
N
985
985
985
929
R2
.455
.293
.424
.513
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 All tests are 2-tailed. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Unified Pres Govt
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Random
Effects
(Energy
Intensity)
-.043
(.005)***

.455
(5.24)
-7.66
(5.58)
-.408
(3.57)
5.60
(4.81)
3.17
(4.28)
-.019
(.090)
-.002
(.060)
.462***
(.035)
.026***
(.006)
-.356
(.609)
-.084
(.277)
1.47
(1.08)
-.649
(.475)
-1.62
(1.27)
.031
(.021)
-1863***
(246)
-.610
(27.1)
101***
(14.4)
-0.621
(1.50)
Yes
929
.378

Sources: BP, BP

Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 (London: BP, 2009); World Bank,
World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009).
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